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What makes Johannes de Silentio sleepless?
 An universal prescriptivist reading of 
 Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling*
EGUCHI Satoshi
                                  Abstract 
 This paper will examine  Kierkegaard's concept of teleological suspension of the ethical, and argue 
that his insistence that Abraham cannot be ethically justified is unsuccessful and resulted from his 
narrow conception of "the ethical". Next, I argue from the universal prescriptivist perspective in 
history of ethical theory, that the main purpose of his writing the book was to keep his contemporaries 
aware of what it means to praise Abraham. Lastly, I will suggest a more relevant alterative of the 
source of the book title. 
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1 Teleological suspension of the ethical? 
Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling (FT)1 is a con-
troversial book. In order to "perceive the pro-
digious paradox of faith", Johannes de silentio, the 
pseudonymous writer of FT, presents three pro-
blems: (1) "Is there a Teleological Suspension of the 
Ethical", (2) "Is there an Absolute Duty to God?", 
and (3) "Was It Ethically Defensible for Abraham 
to Conceal his Undertaking from Sarah, from Eliez-
er, and from Isaac?" He answered yes to the first 
two problems, and no to the last. In a popular 
reading of Kierkegaard, this book is said to suggest 
that faith is higher than morality, and Abraham 
cannot be justified by any rational ethics2. 
 First, we have to identify what Johannes calls 
"the ethical"
, but it is not an easy task. Through-
out FT, We have only one example directly referred 
as "ethical duty", that is, "one must protect one's 
children". We have to interpret what he calls "the 
ethical" in his assertion that Abraham do not belong 
to the sphere of the ethical. 
 Johannes' simple and direct definition of the ethi-
cal is posed in the first paragraph of each "pro-
blemata". In the beginning of "Problema I", he 
says:
The ethical as such is the universal, and 
as the universal it applies to everyone, 
which from another angle means that it 
applies at all time. It rests immanent in 
itself, has nothing outside itself that is its 
telos but it is itself the telos for every-
thing outside itself, and when the ethical
*This paper was read at Kierkegaard Research Centre , Copenhagen, on May 29, 2001. 
 'Fear and Trembling , tr. by Howard H. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press, 1983.  Referees to Kier-
kegaard's works are by the sigla FT. 
 2A famous example is Brand Blanshard's "Kierkegaard on Faith" , The Personalist, 49, 1968, p. 5-22.
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has absorbed this into itself, it goes not 
further. The single individual, sensately 
and psychically qualified in immediacy, is 
the individual who has his telos in the 
universal, and it is his ethical task con-
tinually to express himself in this, to an-
nul his singularity in order to become the 
universal. (FT 54)
 Let's begin with interpreting this vague and 
difficult passage. 
 Johannes contrasts Abraham with Agamemnon, 
Jephthah, and Brutus, who also sacrificed their chil-
dren but, in contrast to Abraham, remained in the 
ethical sphere. Take Agamemnon's case. He 
sacrificed his daughter for the benefit of his com-
munity. 
 Abraham's rightness seems too obvious to Jo-
hannes, but we may hesitate to approve Agamem-
non's decision unconditionally. For example, D. D. 
Raphael, an English moral philosopher, pointed out 
that it was not because his act was right but be-
cause it was wrong and cruel that his story had a 
strong impression to his contemporaries3. Why is 
Johannes so convinced of Agamemnon's rightness? 
 This definition of the ethical is Hegelian. Rough-
ly speaking, in Hegelian system, an action is seen to 
be ethical if it promotes the welfare and value of 
the community. Agamemnon was a leader of the 
community and let public interest take precedence 
over private interest, or let his duty as a leader 
override his duty as a father. Johannes's says that 
he sacrificed his daughter and himself in order to 
protect what is higher than the individual, that is, 
community, nation, or state. 
 In contrast to Agamemnon, Abraham is said to be 
willing to sacrifice Isaac for his faith (and for God), 
not for community and nation. Therefore, Johannes 
insists, he cannot be ethically justified. 
 Then, why is the duty "one should always obey 
God" not an universal duty? If "always obey God" is 
 tnken  ns  nn  ethien1  drity the  story  of  Ahrn  hnm will
not contain "suspension of the ethical". 
 An universal duty, like "one ought not to steal", 
applies to anyone. Such duties will sometimes be 
authorized as God's commands. In this sense, 
"God's precepts" are used abstractly as authority of 
morality. If this is God's precept, it is a precept to 
all human beings. In Abraham's case, however, the 
precept "sacrifice Isaac" is given only to Abraham, 
not as a patriarch or a head of a family, but as a 
particular individual. It was given because Abrah-
am was Abraham, and only once at one time. 
 Ordinary morality does not include a guidance to 
such particular, special case, since God's commands 
are highly unlikely to be given directly. If we take 
the scriptural phrase "If any man come to me, and 
hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and chil-
dren, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own 
life also, he cannot be my disciple." (Luke 14:26), 
God's commands cannot be reduced to duties that 
will promote public welfare, or rather, it may or 
must conflict ordinary morality and duty. There-
fore, Johannes insists, if Abraham is right, there 
are absolute duties to God. 
 But cannot we imagine that, if the command to 
Abraham was really from God, people living with 
Abraham can understand his undertaking? Just as 
Iphigeneia understood his father's plight and ac-
cepted his undertaking, might Isaac accept his 
father? The command to Abraham, "sacrifice your 
son", was indeed given to Abraham as a particular 
individual. But can the precept "if God really com-
mands you to do something directly, obey his 
words" not be one of the cardinal duties of a knight 
of faith? At least, those who have faith like Abra-
ham's may admit and want to justify his action. 
 For Johannes, however, such a justification is im-
possible, because Abraham cannot communicate his 
intention to other people. In this way, the problem 
about an absolute duty to God is related to Proble-
ma III, that is, whether one is to be ethically 
blamed when one doesn't tell his intention to others. 
 It is certain that the Abraham's silence was the
 
3  D . D. Raphael, Moral Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 51
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main theme of FT. Johannes contends that 
"Abraham could not speak." But I think it is a bit 
hard for us to take this insistence at face value. 
Abraham was in fact required to kill his son, and as 
a knight of faith, he was willing to do it. He over-
rode a general duty to protect his child with God's 
particular command. In this, in one sense, I find no 
logical problems, as Johannes alludes. Indeed, 
even if Abraham had told his intention to his peo-
ple, he would not have been understood. People 
would have seen him as somewhat tempted or cor-
rupted by a demon, or of a evil character. But it is 
because God's direct revelation rarely occurs and 
that God requires people to sacrifice one's son is 
really hard to belive. But this is a practical difficul-
ty and not a logical one. If, as Johannes suggests, 
Abraham cannot communicate to other people be-
cause his situation is "particular", not universal, we 
cannot understand the whole story or Johannes's 
speculation itself. Then, if Abraham cannot speak, 
it is because he cannot explain his situation practi-
cally, not theoretically or logically. At least, 
another knight of faith can understand Abraham's 
situation and would want to admit he was right. 
 If one believes his action or decision is ethically 
justified, he must somehow be able to explain rea-
sons to do it. This is the logic of justification, 
which most of us will accept. However, it is hard to 
see even in a very special situation like Abraham's, 
one cannot be justified only because one cannot in 
practice tell his reason to others. Suppose Aga-
memnon had not told of his will to sacrifice his 
daughter because of some practical difficulty, for ex-
ample, because of lack of time. It would not make 
his decision wrong or unjustified. He would have 
said, "I might be misunderstood, and, in practice, 
some surely will blame me, but after deliberation, I 
believe I ought to do it, and I will be justified in the 
most important sense." If so, from my point of 
view, we have to say that the analysis Johannes 
gives us misses the point of ethical justification.
2 Johannes's Sleeplessness 
If we take these lines of reading, we are faced with 
the problems of what is it that Johannes cannot un-
derstand. What render him sleepless? 
 Then, we might wonder whether Johannes's main 
point in this book is really to evaluate or to justify 
Abraham. In the end of each "Probrema", Jo-
hannes repeats the "either-or". Either Hegelian 
theory of ethics is implausible, or else Abraham is 
lost. We can guess from these passages that Jo-
hannes's definition of "the ethical" was his contem-
porary Hegelian, not his own. Then, the main ar-
guments of FT are modus tollens, that is P Q 
and  — Q, therefore  — P. To demonstrate this, Jo-
hannes needs to show somehow that Abraham was 
right, or can be ethically justified in his willingness 
to sacrifice Isaac, but he didn't. Then, we cannot 
see his demonstration successful. He can at most 
say that the an extreme type of faith can conflict 
with Hegelian morality. 
 Careful readers who read the book in Danish 
should have noticed that in FT such words as 
 "Nod"
, "Qval", "Angst" are frequently used, but the 
very keywords "Frygt" and  "Bven" seldom occur4. 
Do we go too far if we say that in this lies Johaness 
de silentio's silence? 
 Then, who is it that feels fear and trembling? Is 
it Abraham? Perhaps so. And Johannes himself, 
of course. He says, "There were countless genera-
tions who knew the story of Abraham by heart, 
word for word, but how many did it render sleep-
less?" (FT 28) But why? Could Johannes not sleep 
for fear that he should be put in Abraham's itua-
tion? Did he identify himself with the father of 
faith? Did he expect one day God himself would 
start to talk to him? Some may want to say to him, 
"Well, Johannes, don't take too seriously what will 
never happen to you. That was Abraham's tory 
and none of your business. In this civilized age, 
even terrible gods won't require such a cruel thing. 
If God should really require you to do it, you can
 
4  Frygt is used only two times and  B .Tven is never, except the title.
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think about it afterwards. Why not take sleeping 
pills?" 
3 An universal prescriptivist interpretation 
Here I suggest that we reread FT against back-
ground of the theory of meta-ethics of the 20th cen-
tury, especially universal prescriptivism. 
 In the "Preliminary Expectoration", Johannes 
speaks about a story of a preacher and a man who 
is suffering from sleeplessness (FT 28). A preacher 
who doesn't really understand Abraham's story can 
give a lecture on it. Abraham was great in that he 
was willing to sacrifice his son, and therefore he is 
to be praised. But if a sleepless man listens to the 
story, he might go home and want to do just as 
Abraham did. If the preacher knows it, he surely 
will stop the man. What if the man answers, "that 
was what you yourself preached about on Sunday?" 
Johannes continues: 
   How is a contradiction such as that of the 
   speaker to be explained? It is because 
   Abraham has gained a prescriptive right 
   to be a great man, so that what he does is 
   great and when another man does the 
   same thing it is a sin, an atrocious sin? 
   In that case, I do not wish to participate 
   in such empty praise. (FT 30)
 If Abraham is great, it cannot be because Abrah-
am is Abraham. If we judge he is great, we must 
judge in the same way whoever is willing to do the 
same thing in the same situation. If we don't admit 
this, we are in linguistic contradiction. Moral judg-
ment must be universalizable if it has full meaning. 
This is one of the main points that universal pre-
scriptivism points out. The other point that univer-
sal prescriptivism take to be characteristic of moral 
judgment is prescriptivity. If I tell you that I 
ought not to smoke in this room, and nevertheless I
smoke in this room, you will doubt I am not talking
to you sincerely, or suspect I do not know the 
meaning of the words. 
 Let us return to the story. God commanded 
Abraham to sacrifice his son. In contrast, that 
sleepless man was given no command of God. So 
the story sounds comical. We ordinary people are 
never likely to be given His command. In addition, 
some insist that it is logically impossible that we be 
put in exactly the same situation as Abraham. But, 
if we say that Abraham ought to do what he did, we 
must, at least, now be ready to do exactly what he 
did if we should be in his position. Whether I have 
a child or not, this may be dreadful. What we say 
about Abraham may require us now to have readi-
ness to commit homicide now. Moreover, because 
of universalizability of moral judgment, we are re-
quired to be ready now to be sacrificed if we are 
put in Isaac's position. It is really hard for us to 
put ourselves in Abraham's ituation, who, without 
any sympathetic assistance from others and without 
any guidelines, as required to sacrifice his son, or in 
Isaac's situation, who, without being informed, as to 
be sacrificed, and to take it seriously, and neverthe-
less judge that Abraham did what he ought to do, 
and to admit, if we were in his position, to do what 
he did. 
 These are the very essentials that universal 
prescriptivists like  R. M. Hare emphasis about logic 
of moral  judgments. 
 If we give more attention to this point of Jo-
hannes, we can see now that his repeated claims 
that "I can't understand Abraham" or "faith is para-
dox" are not concerned with logical or epistemologi-
cal difficulties. It is not even a problem in ethical 
theory, either. By such phrases, he confesses that, 
if he were in Abraham's ituation, he could not do 
what Abraham did. Johannes, who is not a knight 
of faith, is not ready to sacrifice his son. It is pscy-
chological or motivational difficulty. 
 Those who lightly say that Abraham was great 
only approve of Abraham because they are blindly 
following some authority. Their ethical judgments
 5R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, Oxford, 1952. Moral Thinking, Oxford, 1981.
have lost their proper force. 
 If we take this interpretation, I think we can see 
more clearly the main point of Johannes, that is, to 
analyze "speech" in ethical context and make people 
aware of its proper requirement. 
 This affinity of Johannes's thought and universal 
prescriptivism is not a coincidence. I think there 
might be textual justification for my allegation.
We are afraid to let people loose; we are 
afraid that the worst will happen as soon 
as the single individual feels like behaving 
as the single  individual.  ....  I can share 
neither that fear (Frygt) nor that opinion, 
and for the same reason. Anyone who 
has learned that to exist as the single in-
dividual is the most terrible (det  For-
flidige) of all will not be afraid to say 
that it is the greatest of all .... It may 
well be that there are those who need 
coercion, who, if they were given free 
rein, would abandon themselves like un-
manageable animals to selfish appetites. 
But a person will demonstrate that he 
does not belong to them precisely by 
showing that he knows how to speak in 
fear and trembling (Angst og  Bvelse), 
and speak he must out of fear (Frygt) of 
harm, which certainly will not come if he 
speaks out of a knowledge of greatness, a 
knowledge of its terrors, and if one does 
not know the terrors, one does not know 
the greatness, either. (FT pp. 74-5.)
 Surprisingly, this passage is the only one that 
contains the word "Frygt" in the book. Johannes 
stresses here that we should speak in "Angst og 
 Bvelse", and this will help us to prevent ourselves 
from ethical confusion. We know we need sincerity, 
seriousness, fear and trembling whenever we pass 
any proper ethical judgment, but we always forget 
it in our daily life. In "Preface", Johannes talks
6  R . M. Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 1
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about Descartes, "he did what he said and said what 
he did. Alas! Alas! Alas! That is a great rarity in 
our day." (FT 5) In the "Epilogue", he talks about 
the episode that the merchants of Holland had a 
few cargoes sunk in the sea in order to jack up the 
price. One of Johannes' hidden intention is clearly 
to make us recall the importance of sincerity of ut-
terance in ethical theory. He wants to make us 
recall the extremely high cost of faith. Then, his 
target is not only Hegelian thinkers but also those 
who constantly make the price fall by lip worship, 
that is, us ourselves. 
 This course of interpretation lets us understand 
why Kierkegaard had to express his idea indirectly 
in the name of Johannes de silentio. Knowledge 
about the fact is directly communicable. But one's 
moral principles or moral judgments cannot be com-
municated fully by simply mentioning them. As R. 
M. Hare pointed out, the best way to know one's 
moral principle is not to hear what he says but to 
see what he does6.
4 The alternative source of Fear and Trem-
  bling
 I have pointed out that fear in Fear and Trem-
bling is not only fear for God, but also fear which 
one must feel whenever one is to pass any ethical 
judgment. But this interpretation may seem not to 
correspond to the title of the book, since Fear and 
Trembling is said to have come from Paul's words, 
"Therefore
, my beloved, as you have always obeyed, 
not as in my presence only, but now much more in 
my absence, work out your own salvation with fear 
and trembling ." (Phil. 2:12) 
 I admit it is somehow hard to find a link between 
this sentence and my interpretation. But in reality, 
as I have mentioned above, there's no phrases "fear 
(Frygt) for God" in FT. I want to suggest an alter-
native source, that is, also Paul's words, "Slaves, 
obey your earthly masters with respect and fear, 
and with sincerity of heart, just as you would obey
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Christ. Obey them not only to win their favor 
when their eye is on you, but like slaves of Christ, 
doing the will of God from your heart." ("Tjenerre! 
lyder Cders Herrer efter  Kiodet, med Frygt og 
 Bxven, i Cders Hiertes Eenfordighed, somC 
hristo.") (Eph. 6:5-6. Emphasis added.) This pas-
sage surely requires us our sincerity and consisten-
cy in our speech, deed, and heart. It is indeed 
needless to say that, since Kierkegaard was very 
familiar with the Bible and its inner relations, we 
don't have to single out the source of "fear and 
trembling" from the candidates. But I think this
passage is more relevant and close to Johannes's 
point. 
 If we could interpret FT in this way, Johannes's 
concern in this book was not whether Abraham can 
be ethically justified, or how we can justify him. 
Rather, his main concern was to point out the re-
quired relation between our ethical discourse and 
our action and readiness. In this respect, his posi-
tion was much closer to modern philosophers who 
are engaging in meta-ethics, and should be given 
more attention in the history of ethics.
